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CIVIL RIGHTS ACT-BYPASSING THE HEART OF NEWPORT V.
FACT CONCERTS, INC., 453 U.S. 247 (198l}--Obtaining Punitive

Damages from Municipalities for Civil Rights Violations.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The cause of action formulated in section 1983 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871 affords redress for infringements upon civil
rights. l While this statute does not specify the damages recoverable
for civil rights violations, injunctive and declaratory judgments, as
well as compensatory and punitive damages, have been granted. 2
Defendants in these civil rights actions have included both individu
als and local governing bodies. 3 Recently, however, the United
States Supreme Court in Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc. 4 held that
punitive damages were not recoverable from a municipal defendant
I. 42 U.S.c. § 1983 (Supp. V 1981) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the Dis
trict of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
Recovery for civil rights violations is increasingly being sought under this statute. In
Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. I (1980), Justice Powell pointed out that "§1983 actions
now constitute a substantial share of the federal caseload." Id at 27 (Powell, J., dissent
ing). Justice Powell noted that the number of civil rights cases filed in federal court
increased from 296 in 1961 to 13,113 in 1977, not including the numerous petitions filed
by prisoners under section 1983. Id at 27 n.16 (Powell, J., dissenting). Less than twenty
one section 1983 cases were decided in the first fifty years of the enactment of that statute
in 1871. Id at 27; Comment, The Civil Rights Act: Emergence of an Adequate Federal
Civil Remedy?, 26 IND. L.J. 361, 363 (1951).
2. Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 84-88 (3rd Cir. 1965) (§ 1983 is silent as to damages
to be awarded but federal common law, applicable to civil rights statutes, permits recov
ery of exemplary or punitive damages).
3. In Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) the
Court stated that H(l)ocal governing bodies, therefore, can be s~\ed directly under § 1983
for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief. ..." Id at 690.
The individuals who themselves caused the deprivation of civil rights, their supervi
sors, and the governmental unit from which their power was conferred (including school
boards and police departments as well as cities and counties) have been named as de
fendants in section 1983 cases. States remain immune from such suits by the eleventh
amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
4. 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
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in a section 1983 action. 5
While the Fact Concerts Court stated clearly that punitive dam
ages against municipalities were not available under federal law, it
did not discuss the ability of a federal court to assess punitive dam
ages against a municipality when such damages were permitted by
state law. The issue of how to reconcile the history and purpose of
section 1983, as seen by the Supreme Court, with a state's contrary
interpretation of public policy and the purpose of punitive damages
was not addressed by the Court. In fact, the Court stated that "[w]e
do not address the propriety of the punitive damages awarded
against petitioner [city] under Rhode Island law."6 The Court's re
fusal to address this issue leaves open the possibility that a plaintiff
in a federal court pursuing a section 1983 claim might be able to
obtain punitive damages from a municipality, regardless of the
seemingly absolute rule against such damages as embodied in Fact
Concerts.
In Fact Concerts, the Court attempted to limit the liability ex
tended to municipalities in recent years for violations of civil rights. 7
The decision does not, however, render it completely impossible for
a plaintiff in a section 1983 action to receive punitive damages from
a municipal government. Two strategies remain available for the
plaintiff in a proper jurisdictionS to seek and obtain punitive dam
ages: (I) the use of section 1988 and (2) the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction. These two methods will be addressed in this note to
determine the availability of punitive damage awards from a munic
ipal defendant when such awards are provided under the state law,
notwithstanding the Fact Concerts decision. First, the history and
purpose of section 1983 and the general theory behind punitive dam
ages will be examined briefly to better determine the success of these
5. Id at 271. Fact Concerts is one of the recent cases in which the Court has at
tempted to define the limits of liability under section 1983. In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167 (1961), the Court originally limited liability to non-municipal defendants. Monroe
was overruled, however, by Monell v. New York Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658
(1978), when the Court held that municipal and other local governments were subject to
suit under section 1983. Id at 663. The availability of official immunity to municipal
defendants was left open by Monell Id at 701. The Court circumscribed the availability
of this immunity in Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980), by disallowing a
good faith immunity for municipal defendants in section 1983 actions. Id at 625. Fact
Concerts further defines the liability of municipal defendants in section 1983 actions by
making them immune from punitive damage awards. 453 U.S. at 271.
6. Id at 253 n.6.
7. See supra note 5.
8. That is, under a state law which allows punitive damages against a municipality.
Eg., R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-31-1 to 9-31-4 (Supp. 1982) and §§ 45-15-12, 45-15-13 (1980).

1983)

OBTAINING PUNITIVE DAMAGES

195

devices in bypassing the Fact Concerts decision in proper section
1983 actions. 9 The strategies will then be discussed and the potential
for successfully attaining punitive damage awards from municipal
defendants in light of Fact Concerts will be assessed. to
II.

FACT CONCERTS

A. Procedural Development

The city of Newport, Rhode Island, and certain city officials
were named as defendants II in a section 1983 action alleging that
revocation of a license to hold a concert deprived plaintiffs, Fact
Concerts, Inc. (FCI), a promotional corporation,12 of its constitu
tional rights to free expression and due process under color of state
law.13 FCI had previously received state approval to produce a se
ries of concerts at a local state park. 14 FCI then obtained an en
tertainment license from the city of Newport and proceeded to make
arrangements for the upcoming event. 15
Originally, jazz singer Sarah Vaughn was one of the performers
scheduled to appear at the concert. When she cancelled her per
formance in Newport, FCI hired the group Blood, Sweat and Tears
as a replacement. 16 The Newport city council, which included the
Mayor of Newport, tried to prevent Blood, Sweat and Tears from
appearing at the concert. The city council characterized Blood,
Sweat and Tears as a rock group and, out of fear of crowd distur
bances or a "rowdy and undesirable" audience, attempted to ban the
concert entirely unless Blood, Sweat and Tears was removed from
the program. 17
The first of two special city council meetings was held at which
the council would not investigate FCI's characterization of the
group's music or look any further into the nature of the band's mu
sic. IS Instead, the vote of the city council was to forbid the concert
9. See infra notes 56-101 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 115-199 and accompanying text.
II. The officials included the mayor of Newport and the six other members of the
city council. 453 U.S. at 252.
12. Also named as plaintiff was Marvin Lerman, the principal investor in FC!.
13. 453 U.S. at 252.
14. Id. at 249-50.
15. Id. at 250.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Brief for the Respondents at 5, City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S.
247 (1981).
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unless Blood, Sweat and Tears did not play.19 The vote was publi
cized and ticket sales for the concert decreased. 20
Later the same week, the mayor and city council informed FCI
that Blood, Sweat and Tears would be allowed to perform if no rock
music was played. 21 At the second special city council meeting held
the day before the concert was to take place, the council decided to
revoke FCI's license altogether for failure to fulfill the conditions of
the contract, although the council knew the terms of the contract had
been substantially met. 22
On the morning the concert was scheduled to begin, FCI ob
tained a restraining order to enjoin interference with the concert by
the city or its officials. 23 The concert proceeded and included a per
formance by Blood, Sweat and Tears. Less than half the potential
ticket sales were realized, however, and plaintiffs lost approximately
$72,910. 24

FCI then instituted a suit in the United States District Court for
the District of Rhode Island, claiming its constitutional rights of free
expression and due process had been violated under section 1983. 25
Three pendent state tort claims were also brought. 26 Compensatory
and punitive damages were sought with respect to all the claims.
The jury in the district court found for FCI and awarded both com
pensatory and punitive damages. 27 The defendant city and its offi
19. 453 U.S. at 251.
20. fd.
21. fd. Apparently, the threat that Blood, Sweat and Tears was intending to bring

suit against the city for injury to its reputation was a factor in the council's change of
mind. Joint Appendix at 64, City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc. 453 U.S. 247 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Joint Appendix].
22. 453 U.S. at 251-52, 251 n.4. The council's criticisms of FCI's compliance with
the contract were described as "picayune" and "frivolous" by the director of the Rhode
Island Department of Natural Resources, who had examined the concert site prior to the
revocation of the license. The director had informed the City Manager of his opinions
and volunteered to appear at the second council meeting. He was told he was not
needed. fd. at 251 n.4.
23. fd. at 252.
24. fd. at 253.
25. Amended Complaint in Joint Appendix, supra note 21, at 20, 23.
26. The state law claims alleged breach of contract, interference with contractual
relationships and tortious interference with advantageous relationships. fd. at 24-26. At
trial, the multiple state claims were reduced to a single claim for interference with con
tractual relationships. Brief for the Petitioners at 6, City of Newport v. Fact Concerts,
Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
27. Compensatory damages of $72,910 and punitive damages of $275,000 were
awarded. The punitive damage award was divided between the city officials and the city
itself. Seventy-five thousand dollars of the punitive damages award was assessed against
the city officials and the remaining $200,000 was assessed against the city of Newport as
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cials moved for a new trial on the grounds that punitive damages
may not be awarded against a municipality under section 1983 28 and
in the alternative, the damages awarded were excessive. 29 The dis
trict court found no reason why punitive damages should not be
awarded against municipalities as well as individuals in appropriate
circumstances. 3o The motion for a new trial was denied, although
the award was found to be excessive. 31
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit af
firmed the district court decision,32 stating that this area of law was
in a state of flUX. 33 The appellate court stated that punitive damages
were available against municipalities in certain circumstances,34 just
as they were available against individual defendants. 35 The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari because of the confusion
surrounding this issue,36 and held that punitive damages were not
available against municipal defendants in section 1983 suits.37

B. The Supreme Court Decision
In a majority opinion written by Justice Blackmun, the Court
re-examined the congressional intent behind enactment of section
1983 and the Civil Rights Act of 1871 to determine the extent of
municipal immunity from punitive damages. 38 The Court found
punitive damages. 453 U.S. at 253. The district court ordered, and the plaintiff accepted,
a remittitur in the punitive damage award against the city, reducing the award to $75,000
against the city. Id at 254 n.8; Joint Appendix, supra note 21, at 68.
28. 453 U.S. at 253.
29. Id
30. Id at 254; see supra note 27. The district court considered the challenge to the
punitive damages instruction even though it was untimely under FED. R. CIV. P. 51 and
no objection had been made at trial. Id at 255-56.
31. Id at 254.
32. 626 F.2d 1060 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded, 453 U.S. 247 (1981). The
appellate court also noted the failure to object to the punitive damages instructions under
FED. R. CIV. P. 51. Id at 1067.
33. Id
34. The Court of Appeals stated that "punitive damages are available against sec
tion 1983 defendants when there are aggravating circumstances." Id at 1067.
35. Id
36. 453 U.S. at 255. The Court examined the defendant's failure to enter a timely
objection under FED. R. Civ. P. 51 and the lack of plain error in the decision below, but
felt that the "novelty" and need for determination of this issue required an "uncon
stricted review" to promote the interests of justice and efficient judicial administration
(even though the procedure was improper). Id at 257.
37. Id at 271.
38. Id The history and purposes of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 had previously
been examined extensively in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), Monell v. New York
Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S.

198

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6: 193

that by 1871 there was a "settled common-law immunity"39 for mu
nicipal corporations against punitive damages and, in the absence of
a specific provision abrogating this immunity in the Civil Rights Act,
the Court determined that this well-established immunity was in
tended to be incorporated into the Act. 40
Further, the lack of extended legislative debate on section 1 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1871, the predecessor to section 1983,
prompted the Court to examine the legislative history of the Sher
man amendment, a proposed addition to the Civil Rights Act which
would have held municipalities strictly liable for damage by riots or
other violent assembly.41 The court determined that the rejection of
this amendment, which would have explicitly required municipal
governments to compensate those injured, implied that the 42d Con
gress did not intend by its silence to impose liability upon municipal
ities for punitive damages. 42
The Court also discussed the concerns voiced by some legisla
tors in the debates over the Sherman amendment and articulated in
some early cases establishing this immunity. These concerns
stemmed from the beliefs that innocent taxpayers, who should bene
fit from the example being set, were the people punished;43 that in
nocent people were being unfairly punished for the acts of others;44
and that an undue fiscal burden was being placed on cities. 45 Be
cause these concerns were embodied in cases arising prior to 1871,
and were voiced by legislators in the debates surrounding the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, the Court found no intention to abolish the mu
nicipal immunity from punitive damages in cases brought under sec
622 (1980), and Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. I (1980) (dissenting opinion). The Court
recognized from these cases that any review ofliability under section 1983 must include a
consideration of the history and policy of the enactment. 453 U.S. at 266.
39. 453 U.S. at 266.
40. Id at 263 (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967».
41. Id. at 264. Monell v. New York Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)
and Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) are also cases in which the Court turned to
examination of the proposed Sherman amendment due to limited legislative debate on
§ I of the Civil Rights Act. The Sherman amendment was not an amendment to section
I, now section 1983; rather, it was an additional section (§7) sought to be amended to the
entire act. Monell, 436 U.S. at 666.
42. 453 U.S. at 263-64.
43. Id. at 261 (citing M'Gary v. President and Council of the City of Lafayette, 12
Rob. 668, 677 (La. 1846».
44. Id. at 261. Early cases also mentioned that corporations cannot be willful or
malicious on their own and so should not be held liable for punitive damages for the acts
of its officers. Id. at 261-62 (citing Hunt v. City of Boonville, 65 Mo. 620 (1877».
45. Id. at 263.
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tion 1 of the ACt. 46
The Court also reviewed the general policy behind awards of
punitive damages to decide whether such awards against local gov
ernments would be beneficial in the context of section 1983.47 The
retributive purpose of punitive damages was found by the Court to
be hampered by allowing such awards against municipalities. 48 Ret
ribution was viewed by the Court to be of lesser importance than the
compensatory or deterrent aspects of section 1983,49 but assessments
of punitive damage awards against municipal governments were
found also to lack the deterrent effect desired. 50 The Court, there
fore, concluded that the purposes of punitive damage awards were
not served by making municipalities available for such damages. 51
Other public policy issues were also considered in Fact Con
certs. The expanded liability under section 1983, enunciated by the
Court in recent cases, 52 was reviewed. This expansion of the section
1983 remedy, combined with the possibility of punitive damage
awards, was seen by the Court as too great a burden for municipal
governments to bear. 53 In addition, the Court indicated that knowl
edge by the jury of the unlimited taxing power of municipalities may
prejudice their assessment of punitive damages and may result in
excessive cost to the cities. 54 Thus, the Court concluded from its
analysis of these public policy concerns, as well as its analysis of the
46. Id. at 263-64.
47. Id. at 266.
48. Id. at 267. The Court stated that since the victim will be fully compensated
and punitive damages are only a windfall to the plaintiff, innocent taxpayers should not
have to pay this retribution through increased taxes. Id. Moreover, a municipality can
only act through its officials. If one of these officials acts in a willful or malicious manner
such that punitive or exemplary damages are justified, the Court theorized, the individ
ual official should be punished, not the government or its citizens. Id.
49. Id. at 268.
50. Id. at 268-70. The Court did not believe that punitive damage awards based
on the wealth of a municipality would deter individual officials from misconduct. Id.
Officials may also be punished through discharge or through the polls, if elected, without
the necessity of awarding punitive damages against the local government. Id. at 269-270.
If punitive damages are appropriate, the Court reasoned, they should be assessed against
the offending individual based on his financial resources, and not the city's, in order to
effectively deter repeated violations. Id. at 270.
51. Id. at 271.
52. See, e.g., Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. I (1980) (section 1983 applies to viola
tions of federal statutes); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) (good faith
immunity not available to municipalities for constitutional violations); Monell v. New
York Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipalities subject to section 1983
liability).
53. 453 U.S. at 270.
54. Id. at 270-71. See also infra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
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policies behind section 1983 liability and punitive damage awards,
that it would be contrary to public policy if punitive damages were
awarded against municipalities in section 1983 actions. 55
III.
A.

BACKGROUND

Section 1983

Enactment of section I of the Civil Rights Act, the predecessor
to section 1983,56 was a broad congressional action 5 ? taken to enforce
the fourteenth amendment to protect citizens from deprivations of
their civil rights. 58 It provides a federal remedy for individuals
whose civil rights59 have been transgressed by acts of state and local
officials. 60 While no new rights were created, a federal remedial
scheme was deemed necessary to preserve already existing rights. 61
A remedy under section 1983 was extended in Monroe v. Pape 62
to unconstitutional acts by officials abusing the power conferred by
their governmental duties as well as those acting within the scope of
their official duties. The Monroe Court examined what was meant
by "under color of state law" and whether a municipality was a
55. 453 U.s. at 271.
56. Originally enacted in response to violence and disruption by the Ku Klux
Klan, the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was passed during the Reconstruction era. Act of
April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § I, 17 Stat. 13 (1873) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(Supp. V 1981».
57. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174 (1961); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1,4
(1980).
58. 365 U.S. at 171.
59. The original language of section I of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 protected
rights "secured by the Constitution of the United States," but was revised in 1874 to
protect rights "secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. . . ." Act of
April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § I, 17 Stat. 13 (1878) (currently codified as amended at 42 U.S.c.
§ 1983 (Supp. V 1981». See generally Note, Developing Governmenlal Liahilily Under 42
u.S.C § 1983,55 MINN. L. REV. 1201, 1201 n.4, 1215 n.68 (1971). Maine v. Thiboutot,
448 U.S. I (1980), specifically extended the section 1983 cause of action to rights secured
by federal statutes. Id at 4. But if. Middlesex Cty. Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea
Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. I (1981) (limiting Thihoutol if other remedies are made avail
able by statute).
60. The deprivation of the plaintiffs civil rights must be caused "under color of
any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State or Territory." 42 U.S.c.
§ 1983. Proof that the deprivation occurred "under color of state law" is an element that
must be shown along with the existence of a "protected right" in a section 1983 cause of
action. Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970); Monell v. New York Dept.
of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); see also Note, Civil Rights Suils Againsl Slale and
Local Governmenlal Entities and Officials: Rights of Action, Immunilies, and Federalism,
53 S. CAL. L. REV. 945, 952-53 (1980).
61. Note, supra note 60, at 952. See infra note 66 for the remedial purposes of
section 1983.
62. 365 U.S. 167, 184 (1961); see generally Note, supra note 60, at 953.
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"person" liable under section 1983. 63 In so doing, the Court re
viewed the congressional debates surrounding the passage of the
Civil Rights Act in 1871 and the rejection of the proposed Sherman
amendment. 64 The Monroe Court's interpretation of the debates
and history of section 1983 led to its decision that, while section 1983
provides a remedy for civil rights violations caused by the use or
misuse of state law, municipalities were not "persons" under section
1983 and could not be held liable for civil rights violations. 65 The
Court found the purposes behind section 1983 were to remedy situa
tions in which state law explicitly deprived citizens of rights or effec
tively did so by the absence or inadequacy of its laws. 66 The intent
of the statute, however, was not viewed by the Monroe Court as suf
ficiently broad to allow actions to be brought against
municipalities. 67
Seventeen years later, in Monell v. New York Department of So
cial Services ,68 the Supreme Court overruled Monroe to the extent
that it had held municipalities immune from section 1983 suits.69
The Monell Court re-examined the legislative history and congres
sional debates on the Civil Rights Act and Sherman amendment, but
derived a different conclusion than that reached by the Monroe
Court. The Monell Court did not interpret the rejection of the Sher
man amendment as demonstrating an intent to immunize municipal
ities from civil rights suits.70 Rather, section I of the 1871 Act, the
predecessor to section 1983, was viewed by the Monell Court as in
63. 365 u.s. at 187, 191.
64. fd. at 173-91; see supra text accompanying notes 41-42. For a discussion of the
impropriety of the Court's use of the legislative history in Monroe, see Note, supra note
59, at 1205-07 and Note, supra note 60, at 134-35.
65. 365 U.S. at 184, 191. Monroe also clarified that the remedy in section 1983 was
supplementary to any state remedy, id. at 184, and that the violation of plaintiff's civil
rights did not have to be done with the specific intent to so violate them. fd. at 187. See
Note, supra note 59, at 1203-04.
66. 365 U.S. at 173-74. The specific remedial purposes of section 1983 were seen as
overriding state laws that deprived citizens of federal rights, providing a federal remedy
where state law was inadequate, and providing a supplementary federal remedy when
theoretically adequate state remedies were not applied with an even hand. fd. See also
Note, supra note 60, at 951 n.21.
67. 365 U.S. at 187. The Court emphasized the rejection of the Sherman amend
ment, the lack of constitutional power of the Congress to impose obligations on local
governments, and the Dictionary Act, ch. 71, 16 Stat. 431 (1871), which does not mandate
that municipalities be included in the definition of "person." 365 U.S. at 188-91.
68. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
69. fd. at 663.
70. fd. at 669-683.
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tending a broad remedy for violations of federally protected rightS. 71
The Monel! Court reconsidered the Monroe Court interpretation of
the term "person" and concluded that municipal corporations and
other local governmental units were to be included within its scope. 72
Thus, the intent of the 42d Congress is now perceived as embracing
municipalities in the ambit of section 1983 liability.73 Now, munici
pal governments may be sued for "monetary, declaratory, or injunc
tive relief where. . . the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional
implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or
decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's of
ficers."74 These governmental units, as well as individual defend
ants, may also be held liable for unconstitutional action stemming
from the government's policy or custom, even though such custom
may not be formally codified or approved. 75 Local governments,
however, may not be held liable for violations of civil rights based
on a respondeat superior theory.76 Currently, section 1983 is seen as
7 I. Id. at 685.
72. The Court re-interpreted the meaning of some comments made during the
1871 congressional debates and found the Monroe Court misapprehended them. Id. at
699. The Court based its decision on examination of the common law rule as it existed in
1871 that municipal corporations were to be treated as natural persons and were suable
in federal court. Id. at 687-88. The definition of "person" in the Dictionary Act was also
reconsidered and held to be applicable. Id. at 688-89. The Monroe Court's departure
from prior practice by not distinguishing between school boards (which had been held
liable) and municipalities, and its "encouragement" of civil rights violations by allowing
municipalities to rely on their immunity were also held determinative. Id. at 695-99.
73. Id. at 701. The Monell Court, unlike that in Monroe, seemed satisfied to im
pose liability on municipal defendants in the absence of a clear statement to the contrary
in the Civil Rights Act or any subsequent legislative action. Id.
74. 436 U.S. at 690.
75. Id. at 690-9 I.
76. Id. at 694. The Court did not discuss any other types of immunity municipali
ties might hold, other than immunity from liability on a respondeat superior basis, be
cause the constitutional violations in Monell stemmed from official policy. Id. at 694-95.
Federal courts allowed a good faith immunity for municipalities until Owen v. City of
Independence,445 U.S. 622 (1980), abrogated this good faith defense for municipalities
and their officers. The Owen Court examined the purposes of section 1983 in its determi
nation that this immunity should be abrogated. Id. at 650-656.
Other traditional, though limited immunities may be permitted to some extent by
some federal courts, but the policies and purposes of section 1983 and the compatability
of the immunity must be explored. See, e.g., Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978)
(qualified immunity for prison officials); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (abso
lute immunity for state prosecutors); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (qualified
immunity for local school board members); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974)
(qualified immunity for governor and other state officials); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547
(1967) (absolute immunity for judges); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (quali
fied immunity for legislators). Cf Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690 (1982) (President
entitled to absolute immunity); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2727 (1982) (government
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providing a remedy for violations of federally protected rights
caused by official policy, whether or not written as law, and this stat
ute must be construed broadly in order to be fully effective. 77
B. Punitive Damages
Although section 1983 does not specify remedies for redressing
violations of civil rights, it generally is agreed that injuries caused by
the deprivation of civil rights are ameliorated through compensatory
damage awards. 78 In reaching this conclusion, courts have examined
the purpose of section 1983.79 The goal of section 1983 is to protect
injuries sustained due to violations of federally protected rights. 80
Compensation for injuries is the basic principle of damages devel
oped by the common law of tortS. 81 This common law rule of dam
ages has been examined and found to be compatible with the
purpose of section 1983. 82 This suggests that, at the very least, the
principle of compensation governs injuries caused by deprivation of
civil rights. But "[t]his is not to say that exemplary or punitive dam
ages might not be awarded in a proper case under § 1983 with the
specific purpose of deterring or punishing violations of constitutional
rights."83
officials acting in discretionary capacity entitled to qualified immunity). For an excellent
discussion of the legislative history of section 1983 through Monell as well as the effect of
Owen on immunities, see Comment, Owen v. City ofIndependence: Expanding the Scope
of Municipal Liability Under Section 1983, 47 BROOKLYN L. REV. 517 (1981) and K.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, §§ 25.00-3 to 25.00-4, 26.15 to 26.21, 26.22,
questions 6, 7, 18 (Supp. 1982).
77. 436 U.S. at 690-91.
78. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 255 (1978), and cases cited therein.
79. Id at 254-55; Edmonds v. Dillin, 485 F. Supp. 722, 730 (N.D. Ohio 1980).
80. See supra notes 56-76 and accompanying text.
81. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, LAW OF TORTS § 25.1, at 1299 (1956); see also Fisher
v. City of Miami, 172 So. 2d 455, 457 (Fla. 1965) (concerning damages under state tort
law: "[T]he primary basis for an award of damages is compensation. That is, the objec
tive is to make the injured party whole to the extent that it is possible to measure his
injury in terms of money." (emphasis in original».
82. E.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247,255-59 (1978) (stating that "[t]o the extent
that Congress intended that awards under § 1983 should deter the deprivation of consti
tutional rights, there is no evidence that it meant to establish a deterrent more formidable
than that inherent in the award of compensatory damages."); Edmonds v. Dillin, 485 F.
Supp. 722, 730 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (stating that "[t]he fundamental goal embodied in the
civil rights statutes of compensating aggrieved individuals for violations of their constitu
tional rights is fulfilled by the availability of compensatory damages. . . .").
83. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257 n.ll (1978); accord Silver v. Cormier, 529
F.2d 161, 163 (10th Cir. 1976) (punitive damages may be awarded in "aggravating cir
cumstances"); Stolberg v. Members of Bd. of Tr. for State Coli. of Conn.), 474 F.2d 485,
489 (2d Cir. 1973) ("appropriate" § 1983 cases); Caperci v. Huntoon, 397 F.2d 799, 801
(1st Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968) (evil intent standard); Basista v. Weir,
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Punitive damages typically are awarded with the specific design
of punishing the offending party and deterring others from commit
ting like offenses. 84 When more than compensatory or injunctive re
lief seems warranted,85 punitive damages may be awarded against
individual wrongdoers in section 1983 cases provided that the poli
cies of punishment and deterrence are furthered. 86
Most of the cases that have examined the issue agree, however,
that, when punitive damages are assessed against a municipality
rather than an individual or a private corporation, the rationale sup
340 F.2d 74, 87 (3d Cir. 1965) (federal law allows punitive damages; no standard
mentioned).
84. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 2, at 9 (4th ed. 1971); see also
Edmonds v. Dillin, 485 F. Supp. 722, 730 (N.D. Ohio 1980); Fisher v. City of Miami, 172
So.2d 455, 457 (Fla. 1965); Chappell v. City of Springfield, 423 S.W.2d 810, 814 (Mo.
1968); McClellan and N orthcross, Remedies and Damagesfor Violations of Constitutional
Rights, 18 DUQ. L. REV. 409 (1980); see also Note, Punitive Damage LiabllilyofMunicipal
Corporations in Pennsylvania, 84 DICK. L. REV. 267,274 (1979) (discussion of three dif
ferent approaches to insulating municipalities from punitive damages including the
"functional approach" of analyzing the purposes behind punitive damages and examin
ing if these purposes are filled).
85. Hild v. Bruner, 496 F. Supp. 93, 99-100 (D. N.J. 1980). Varying standards are
applied when determining when punitive damages are necessitated. In general, malice or
reckless disregard of plaintiffs rights must be shown. Id at 100 ("The test is whether
defendant acted with actual knowledge that he was violating a federally protected right
or with reckless disregard of whether he was doing so.").
Stolberg v. Board of Tr. for State Coli. of Conn., 474 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1973) also
discussed the standards used to determine when punitive damages should be awarded in
section 1983 cases: where willful or malicious violations of constitutional rights are
proved; where a defendant has acted willfully and in gross disregard for plaintiffs rights;
and where a defendant acted with knowledge of the violation of rights or with reckless
disregard of plaintiffs rights. Id at 489, and cases cited therein. Other section 1983
cases have applied different standards. E.g., Miller v. Apartments and Homes of N.J.,
Inc., 646 F.2d 101, III (3d Cir. 1981) (knowledge or reckless disregard, wanton miscon
duct, wrongdoing by action or knowledgeable inaction, and authorizing, ratifying or fos
tering the acts of violation); Alicea Rosado v. Garcia Santiago, 562 F.2d 114, 121 (1st Cir.
1977) (oppression, malice, gross negligence, willful or wanton misconduct, and reckless
disregard for plaintiffs rights may justify punitive damages but vindication of personal
pride is not the sort of malice usually punished in this way); Caperci v. Huntoon, 397
F.2d 799 (1st Cir. 1968) (evil intent standard), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1980); Manfre
doni a V. Barry, 401 F. Supp. 762, 773 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (bad faith, improper motive, and
gross disregard for plaintiffs constitutional rights); Rzeznick V. Chief of Police of South
ampton, 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1489, 1492,407 N.E.2d 389, 391 (1980) (violations
of an individual's rights aggravated by actual malice, evil intent, deliberate oppression,
wilful or wanton misconduct or reckless disregard).
Whether or not the acts meet the applicable standard, and the amount of punitive
damages awarded if the standard is met, is a question of fact left to the discretion of the
trial judge or jury. Stolberg, 474 F.2d at 489; Rzeznick, 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at
1492,407 N.E.2d at 391.
86. Ranells v. City of Cleveland, 41 Ohio St. 2d I, 321 N.E.2d 885, 887 (1975);
accord Alicea Rosado V. Garcia Santiago, 562 F.2d 114, 121 (1st Cir. 1977).
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porting punitive damages dissolves. 8 ? Many suggest that in the ab
sence of a statute specifically providing for punitive damages against
a municipality, such damages should not be permitted. 88 These
cases are in general agreement that punitive damages against munic
ipalities do not punish or deter the offender and may result in exces
sive damage awards. The retributive purpose of punitive damages is
not considered to be effectuated when assessed against municipalities
because the taxpayers, and not the offender, bear the brunt of the
punishment. It is the taxpayers who actually pay the damage award
and would be punished as wrongdoers even though they are sup
posed to benefit from the public example made of the wrongdoer. 89
Deterrence is also not achieved by assessing punitive damages
87. Ranells v. City of Cleveland, 41 Ohio St. 2d I, 10,321 N.E.2d 885, 889 (1975);
Fisher v. City of Miami, 172 So. 2d 455, 457 (Fla. 1965); Chappell v. City of Springfield,
423 S.W.2d 810,814 (Mo. 1968); Edmonds v. Dillon, 485 F. Supp. 722,730 (N.D. Ohio
1980). See also Note, supra note 84, at 274, in which the author states: "Cases that
follow the functional approach hold that an award of punitive damages against a munici
pality would violate the basic punitive purpose behind the award." Id, and cases cited
therein. But see Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (stating that a
city is considered a "person" for purposes of the federal antitrust laws, id at 394-97,
which subjects them to liability for threefold damages if such laws are violated, id at 396
n.13, although the Court did not decide the question of remedy in that case. Id at 402);
Young v. City of Des Moines, 262 N.W.2d 612 (Iowa 1978) (allowing punitive damages
against municipality); Ray v. City of Detroit, 67 Mich. App. 702, 242 N.W.2d 494 (1976)
(exemplary damages permitted against municipalities but not for punitive purposes);
Note, supra note 84, at 281-85 (discussion of the view permitting punitive damages
against a municipality).
88. E.g., Fisher v. City of Miami, 172 So. 2d 455, 457 (Fla. 1965); Chappell v. City
of Springfield, 423 S.W. 2d 810, 814 (Mo. 1968); see Edmonds v. Dillin, 485 F. Supp. 722,
730 & n.8 (N.D. Ohio 1980). But see Ranells v. City of Cleveland, 41 Ohio 2d 1,8,321
N.E.2d 885, 890 (N.D. Ohio 1975) (dissenting opinion) (punitive damages should be
awarded against municipality unless statute specifically forbids); Note, supra note 84, at
285 n.1O I, 296 (citing courts and commentators which advocate awards of punitive dam
ages against municipalities, but concluding that in the absence of a clear statutory provi
sion, courts should continue to prohibit these awards based on case law).
89. Fisher v. City of Miami, 172 So. 2d 455,457 (Fla. 1965); Chappell v. City of
Springfield, 423 S.W.2d 810, 814 (Mo. 1968). This idea is well stated in Note, supra note
84, at 274:
A municipal corporation is composed of innocent, tax-paying citizens. This
group of tax-paying citizens is the same group that is supposed to benefit from
the public example set by the punishment of the wrongdoer. Imposition of pu
nitive damages on a municipal corporation places the burden of paying those
damages upon the very group that the law seeks to protect through the addition
of the extra measure of punishment intended by the award of punitive dam
ages. . . . Since it would be 'absurd and illogical' to hold that punishment
should be imposed upon the public, courts have declared such a position con
trary to public policy, and have denied recovery of punitive damages from a
municipal corporation.
Id at 274-75 (footnotes omitted).
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against municipal defendants. An award against the municipality
may have little or no effect on the wrongdoing employee, through
whom the municipality acts. This is true because the employee
would not be able to pay such a large award if it were assessed
against the employee individually or even if indemnification were
sought by the city.90 These employees will not be deterred because
they know their employer will pay the costs of their wrongdoing. 91
Appropriate alternatives are available, however, to discipline
wrongdoing employees without recourse to punitive damage awards
against a municipal employer. 92 For example, some municipal em
ployees might be accountable to the electorate and therefore could
be punished through the electoral process. 93 It has been suggested
that if punitive damages are to be awarded, they should be based on
the employee's financial resources and not the city's, to be a true
mechanism of deterrence. 94
Another reason given for the blanket prohibition against puni
tive damage awards against municipalities is the prejudicial effect
the unlimited taxing power of a municipality will have on the jury.95
Since evidence of the wealth of a tortfeasor generally is admissible to
help determine the amount of punitive damages to be awarded,96
and a city's wealth virtually is unlimited when its taxing power is
considered,97 juries may be more likely to award huge amounts of
punitive damages. If the wealth of the defendant were not admitted
as evidence, the jury could not determine an amount adequate to
punish the city and the retributive element of these types of awards
would be removed. 98 In addition, while there is a general rule that
punitive damages must bear a reasonable relation to the amount of
90.

Fisher v. City of Miami, 172 So. 2d 455, 457 (Fla. 1965); Note, supra note 84, at

275.
91. Note, supra note 84, at 275. The deterrent effect of these punitive damage
awards against one municipality also will not necessarily have a deterrent impact on
other municipal corporations. ld at 276.
92. Fisher v. City of Miami, 172 So.2d 455, 457 (Fla. 1965); Chappell v. City of
Springfield, 423 S.W.2d 810, 814 (Mo. 1968); Note, supra note 84, at 276.
93. Chappell v. City of Springfield, 423 S.W.2d 810, 814 (Mo. 1968).
94. Note, supra note 84, at 276 n.46. The cosf of compensation, if assessed against
the individual at trial or by indemnification, may be sufficient to deter as well.
95. See, e.g. , Fisher v. City of Miami, 172 So. 2d 455, 457 (Fla. 1965); Chappell v.
City of Springfield, 423 S.W.2d 810, 814 (Mo. 1968); Ranells v. City of Cleveland, 41
Ohio 2d I, 8, 321 N.E.2d 885, 889 (1975).
96. See, e.g., Ranells v. City of Cleveland, 41 Ohio 2d I, 8, 321 N.E.2d 885, 889
(1975); Note, supra note 84, at 277.
97. Ranells v. City of Cleveland, 41 Ohio 2d I, 8,321 N.E.2d 885, 889 (1975).
98. Fisher v. City of Miami, 172 SO.2d 455, 457 (Fla. 1965). The punishment ele
ment would not be served because only a small award is necessary to punish a poor man
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the compensatory damages awarded, this has never effectively pre
vented excessive punitive damage awards. 99 The effect of the jury's
knowledge of a municipality's unlimited taxing power continues to
have an impact on the decision that such awards are contrary to pub
lic policy.100
To summarize, the theory supporting punitive damage awards
in section 1983 actions suggests that such damages may be assessed
against municipalities, over and above compensatory damages, if
such need is demonstrated and if the purposes of punishment and
deterrence are served. Such damages, however, have not tradition
ally been permitted against municipalities because, in practice, they
neither deter nor punish, and are often excessive. This traditional
majority rule prohibiting punitive damages from municipalities
prompted the Fact Concerts decision,101 thereby creating a definitive
immunity from punitive damages for municipal defendants in sec
tion 1983 suits brought in federal courts.
IV.
A.

The Effect

ANALYSIS

of Fact Concerts

Potentially, there are section 1983 cases that warrant punitive
damages against municipal defendants, but the inability to promote
the policy behind punitive damages militates against the award of
such damages. 102 Fact Concerts renders it impossible for the piaintiff
in a section 1983 case to receive punitive damage awards when the
defendant is a local governmental unit, even if the state law frees
municipalities from the traditional prohibition against punitive
damages. 103
but more is necessary to punish a rich man. State v. Sanchez, 119 Ariz. 64, 67, 579 P.2d
568, 571 (1976).
99. Note, supra note 84, at 277-78.
100. It has also been suggested that the potential for large punitive damage awards
contradicts public policy because it would be another "financial burden[] addled] to the
specter of financial ruin already facing some cities." Edmonds v. Dillin, 485 F. Supp.
722, 730 (N.D. Ohio 1980).
101. 453 U.S. at 263-64.
102. These may be cases in which the only damages truly available to the injured
party are punitive, and compensation for the deprivation of the rights involved amounts
to very little in monetary terms. Eg., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980). It remains
important in these cases for the defendant to be punished and deterred for depriving the
plaintiff of these rights.
103. The plaintiff cannot now receive the damages he or she might have received
prior to Fact Concerts because courts applying the majority rule prohibiting punitive
damages against municipalities often made exceptions to that rule and allowed punitive
damages against municipal governments in extraordinary circumstances or where the
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Although Fact Concerts made a distinction between individual
defendants and municipal defendants in section 1983 claims, it is un
clear if such a distinction is effective. For example, the deterrent
purpose of such damage awards may not be served if individual de
fendants are indemnified against such judgments, 104 just as munici
palities are not deterred because the damage award may be paid
merely by raising taxes. Thus, neither individuals nor municipal de
fendants may be deterred or punished and the general purposes of
punitive damages are therefore not effectuated.
In addition, the Court has overlooked the fact that individual
defendants may be judgment-proof, and if the case is such that puni
tive damages are the bulk of the award, the plaintiff may again be
victimized. The purpose of a section 1983 cause of action to redress
those deprived of their civil rights,105 is not fulfilled by such a result.
The distinction between individual and municipal defendants, there
fore, also is not efficacious in serving any of the goals enunciated by
the Court.
Subsequent to Fact Concerts, courts have disallowed or reversed
the punitive damages assessed against municipal defendants for vio
lations of civil rights in suits brought under section 1981,106 section
1982,107 and section 1983.108 Thus, plaintiffs in situations in which
citizens or superior officers of the municipality ratified or authorized the violative con
duct. See Note, supra note 84, at 281-83. This inability for a plaintiff to recover at all
may even seem to some municipal employees as a sign of condonation to deprive people
of those rights for which little compensation may be had.
104. Some municipalities indemnify their employees in cases where the actions
complained of arose within the scope of the employee's duties. See, e.g., CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 7-465 (West Supp. 1982); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258, § 9 (West Supp.
1982). Because the acts complained of in section 1983 actions must arise "under color of
state law," it is likely that many individual defendants in such cases will be seen as acting
within the scope of their duties and so will be indemnified ifthe local statute so provides.
105. See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
106. Heritage Homes v. Seekonk Water District, 670 F.2d I (1st Cir. 1982) (used
Fact Concerts' rationale for § 1981 claim stating this was not one of those situations
where taxpayers themselves were malicious and should be punished, although facts of
case suggest it was such a case, and court below suggested that there was "open participa
tion" by taxpayers, 648 F.2d 761, 763 (1st Cir. 1981)}; Tyler v. Board of Education of
New Castle County, 519 F. Supp. 834, 837 (D. Del. 1981) (reasoning in Fact Concerts
applies to school districts); Ferguson v. Joliet Mass Transit District, 526 F. Supp. 222
(N.D. Ill. 1981) (reasoning in Fact Concerts used for § 1981 case). But see Boyd v. Shaw
nee Mission Public Schools, 522 F. Supp. 1115 (D. Kan. 1981) (reasoning of Fact Con
certs not applicable to school district in § 1981 claim).
107. Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 536 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Wis. 1982) (overruling
Morales v. Haines, 486 F.2d 880 (7th Cir. 1973) which held municipalities liable for
punitive damages with respect to § 1982).
108. Ray v. City of Edmond, 662 F.2d 679 (10th Cir. 1981); Gonzales v. City of
Peoria, 537 F. Supp. 793 (D. Ariz. 1982); Bornhoff v. White, 526 F. Supp. 488 (D. Ariz.
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punitive damages against a municipality seem warranted or neces
sary, must either bypass Fact Concerts, 109 or urge that it be distin
guished. 110 Given the broad rule laid down in Fact Concerts,
however, which effectively bestowed immunity upon municipalities
against punitive damages in many types of civil rights cases, III it is
improbable that the case will be distinguished easily.1l2 Nonethe
less, punitive damage awards forbidden by Fact Concerts may be
attainable through use of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 113 and pendent
jurisdiction. I 14

B. Section 1988
A state law that abrogates municipal immunity from punitive
damages may be beneficial to a plaintiff bringing a section 1983
claim against a municipality or other local governmental unit in a
federal court because section 1988 115 may permit use of state reme
dial measures where remedies under the federal statute are
insufficient.
Section 1988 recognizes that the federal laws governing viola
tions of civil rights may not be "adapted to" or may be "deficient in
the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish of
fenses. . . ."116 It directs the courts to use "the common law, as
modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the state
wherein the court having jurisdiction of such . . . cause is held" as
1981); Peters v. Township of Hopewell. 534 F. Supp. 1324 (D.N.J. 1982); DiGiovanni v.
City of Philadelphia. 531 F. Supp. 141 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Tolbert v. County of Nelson. 527
F. Supp. 836 (W.O. Va. 1981).
109. See infra notes 115-199 and accompanying text.
110. For example. the court in Black v. Stephens. 662 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1981) dis
tinguished Fact Concerts and awarded punitive damages against a municipality based
solely on a procedural difference. Id at 184 n.1. Black seems to represent the Third
Circuit's manifestation of its disagreement with the Fact Concerts' outcome because the
procedural difference upon which it was distinguished was extremely slight. Also. it
appears that Black was a vehicle for disagreement with the Supreme Court because. as
pointed out in the dissent in Black. the punitive damages issue was not even briefed in
the court below and need not have been discussed on appeal. Id at 205 (Garth. J .•
dissenting). It is not likely. however. that other courts will follow Black or so quickly
distinguish the Supreme Court decision in Fact Concerts on such limited procedural
differences.
III. 453 U.S. at 271.
112. But see Black v. Stephens. 662 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1981) (distinguishing Fact
Concerts).
113. 42 U.S.c. § 1988 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). See infra notes 115-155 and accom
panying text.
114. 453 U.S. at 253 n.6. See infra notes 157-199 and accompanying text.
115. 42 U.S.c. § 1988 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
116. Id
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long as these state laws are "not inconsistent" with federal laws and
the Constitution. I 17 The key elements to demonstrating that section
1988 should be used are a deficiency in the federal law, consistency
between the state law to be applied and the underlying policies of the
federal civil rights statute,118 and uniformity with the remedial
scheme presented by the federal statute.
1.

Deficiency of the Federal Statute

It is difficult to determine what is meant by "deficiency" of the

remedial provisions of the federal statutes, although that is what sec
tion 1988 was designed to alleviate. 1I9 Clearly, a federal law is not
deficient solely because a state law is more favorable to the plain
tiff; 120 this is a federal policy and should not be nullified by use of
the state law by the plaintiff. 121
Silence of the federal law as to an important issue, however, has
been interpreted as a deficiency. 122 If the governing statute is silent
117. Id. Section 1988 provides in pertinent part:
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district courts by
the provisions of this Title, and of Title "CIVIL RIGHTS," and of Title
"CRIMES," for the protection of all persons in the United States in their civil
rights and for their vindication, shall be exercised and enforced in conformity
with the laws of the United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the
same into effect; but in all cases where they are not adapted to the object, or are
deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish
offenses against law, the common law, as modified and changed by the constitu
tion and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil
or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Consti
tution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to govern the said courts
in the trial and disposition of the cause, and, if it is of a criminal nature, in the
infliction of punishment on the party found guilty.
Id. In 1976, section 1988 was amended to provide for attorney's fees in civil rights ac
tions. Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, § 2, 90 Stat.
2641 (1976), codified at 42 U.S.c. § 1988 (Supp. V 1981).
118. Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978); Moor v. County of Alameda,
411 U.S. 693 (1973); Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965); Brazier v. Cherry, 293
F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1961). BUI see Eisenberg, Slale Law in Federal Civil Righls Cases: The
Proper Scope 0/ Seclion 1988, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 499 (1980) (contending that this inter
pretation of section 1988 is correct and analyzing it in a fresh light based on the legisla
tive history of section 1988, not the language).
119. See Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584,588 (1978).
120. Brown v. Morgan County, 518 F. Supp. 661,665 (N.D. Ala. 1981); Robertson
v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 593 (1978); See also Note, Developing Governmental Liability
Under 42 u.S.C § 1983, 55 MINN. L. REV. 1201, 1218 (1971) (discussing the effects of
interpreting the law as deficient if it fails to produce the desired result).
121. Note, supra note 120, at 1218.
122. Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978) (§ 1983 silent as to survival of
civil rights actions); Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973) (§ 1983 silent as to
survival of civil rights actions); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229 (1969)
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on an issue a party wishes to pursue, at first glance it might appear
that the state law may be used. 123 The simple and oft-cited test of
Brazier v. Cherry 124 illustrates the idea that state law may be utilized
easily whenever the federal statute is found inadequate in some way:
What is needed in the particular case under scrutiny to make the
civil rights statutes fully effective? The answer to that inquiry is
then matched against (a) federal law and if it is found wanting the
court must look to (b) state law currently in effect. To whatever
extent (b) helps, it is automatically available. . . . I25

Because section 1983 is silent on the issue of damages, it may seem
under the Brazier test, that a state law allowing punitive damages
against municipalities may be applied. Section 1983, however, may
not be viewed as being silent on the issue of punitive damages be
cause Fact Concerts added a gloss to the statute in that it forbids
these damages against municipal defendants. In addition, an ele
ment of inconsistency, not mentioned in the Brazier test, is extremely
important. 126 Even if silence is considered a deficiency, and the fed
eral law is "found wanting,"127 the state law is not necessarily
available.
2.

Consistency of State Law with Policies Behind the
Federal Statute

Even if the federal statute is deemed deficient, the relevant state
law may not be available because, as stated in Robertson v.
Wegmann,128 the state statute is "the principal reference point" but
is "subject to the important proviso that state law may not be applied
(§ 1982 silent as to remedies); Gee v. CBS, Inc., 471 F. Supp. 600 (E.D. Pa. 1979); U.S. ex
rei Washington v. Chester County Police Dept., 300 F. Supp. 1279 (E.D. Pa. 1969)
(§ 1981 silent as to damage remedies); see also Eisenberg, supra note 118, at 508-15.
123. Cf Eisenberg, supra note 118, at SIS (''tests for deficiency ... that tum solely
on the study of federal statutes ... thrust [courts) towards state law without regard to the
propriety of the state rule and without regard to whether a federal rule would be more
appropriate").
124. 293 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1961).
125. Id. at 409. See, e.g., Brown v. Morgan County, 518 F. Supp. 661, 662 (N.D.
Ala. 1981); U.S. ex rei Washington v. Chester County Police Dept., 300 F. Supp. 1279,
1282 and n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
126. E.g., Wilcher v. Gain, 311 F. Supp. 754, 755 (N.D. Cal. 1970) ("[I)n no case
brought to this Court's attention has a state law remedy been allowed a plaintiff under
§ 1981 el seq. when that state law remedy was inconsistent with the remedial scheme
established by the federal statute.")
127. Brazier, 293 F.2d at 409.
128. 436 U.S. 584 (1978).
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when it is 'inconsistent. . .''' with federal law. 129 The policies of the
federal law must therefore be examined to determine whether the
state law is inconsistent with these federal policies. l3O
The Court in Robertson found that the policies underlying sec
tion 1983 were "compensation of persons injured by deprivation of
federal rights and prevention of abuses of power by those acting
under color of state law."l31
A federal court, accepting the underlying policies of section
1983 as articulated in Robertson, might find that an award of puni
tive damages against a municipal government was inconsistent with
the policy behind section 1983 based on the Court's decision in Fact
Concerts to prohibit such damages in a section 1983 cause of ac
tion. 132 This is likely since the Fact Concerts Court analyzed the
policies of section 1983 before deciding that punitive damages
against municipalities would be inconsistent with that federal law. 133
A court applying this analysis is likely to conclude that an inconsis
tency remains even though a state has decided its local governmental
Id at 589-90 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976 & Supp. V 1981».
Id at 590. See also Brown v. Morgan County, 518 F. Supp. 661, 663 (N.D.
Ala. 1981); accord Kates & Kouba, Liability of Public Entities Under Section 1983 of the
Civil Rights Act, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 131, 157 (1972); see generally Eisenberg, supra note
1I8, at 518-521.
131. Robertson, 436 U.S. at 591. See also supra notes 56-76 and accompanying
text. The Robertson Court determined that the state survival statutes at issue were not
inconsistent with these policies. Robertson, 436 U.S. at 592. See Brown v. Morgan
County, 518 F. Supp. 661, 663-64 (N.D. Ala. 1981).
132. Cf Wilcher v. Gain, 31I F. Supp. 754 (N.D. Cal. 1970). This case was de
cided prior to Monell and rejected municipal liability on the basis of Monroe, although
the state law allowed it. The state law was considered inconsistent with the federal policy
delineated in Monroe. 311 F. Supp. at 755. This situation is similar to Fact Concerts.
Courts may reject the idea of punitive damage assessments against municipalities even if
state law allowed them because of the inconsistency with the federal rule laid out in Fact
Concerts prohibiting such damages. But see Kates & Kouba, supra note 130, at 160-61.
The authors of that 1972 article suggest that Wilcher was decided wrongly and was "slav
ish adherence to precedent." Id at 161. They urge that the policy of section 1983 must
be reinterpreted when examined together with section 1988. They state that, when taken
together, the policies of section 1983 and section 1988 may permit use of the state law,
especially when application of a state law which allows what the federal cases prohibit
has not been discussed. Id at 157, 160.
Federal courts could be urged to consider the policies of section 1988 together with
section 1983 under applicable state laws allowing punitive damages against municipali
ties since section 1988 was not mentioned in Fact Concerts. If successful, a court may
decide that the federal law must take the municipalities as it finds them; if punitive dam
ages may be awarded against them under state law, then this state law should be recog
nized, through section 1988, in a section 1983 cause of action in a federal court.
133. See supra notes 79-99 and accompanying text.
129.
130.
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units may be penalized. 134
In Miller v. Apartments and Homes of New Jersey, Inc. ,135 the
Third Circuit applied an even farther reaching analysis to determine
whether state or federal law should be used. Initially, the court de
scribed the "interstitial character" of federal law as asserted by Pro
fessor Hart. 136 The court then described the process which
determines whether to fill an interstice with federal common law or
state law as an analysis involving: the congressional purpose and the
underlying goals of a statute; the extent to which the application of
federal law would further those goals or the application of state law
would impede them; and the traditional allocation of functions be
tween state and federal law. 137
Although the Robertson analysis 138 seems to inhere in the Miller
test, a plaintiff might prefer the more extensive test enunciated in
Miller. Under this test, as under the traditional Robertson test, a
plaintiff may urge that the congressional intent was not to disallow
punitive damages to be assessed against municipalities but that the
meaning of the silence on this issue is, from section 1988, that state
law should prevail. The statute's silence may also be interpreted as
meaning that any remedy necessary to vindicate plaintiff's rights, if
allowed by state law, is permitted. 139 The goals behind section 1983
have previously been determined to be to compensate and deter civil
rights violations. 140 It is improbable that federal courts would accept
much variance in the statement of these goals if offered by a plaintiff.
These courts may not view the goal of compensation as being served
by the award of punitive damages against municipalities, even if the
state allowed it. 141 Compensatory damages are not impeded and pu
nitive damages are paid above and beyond the costs of compensa
tion. The goal of deterrence may be fulfilled, however, if the state's
goal in permitting punitive damages in these cases is also to deter.
134. The state courts or legislatures are unlikely to have specifically addressed the
federal statutes governing violations of civil rights in their decisions to allow assessments
of punitive damages against municipalities.
135. 646 F.2d 101 (3d Cir. 1981).
136. Id. at 105. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART
AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, 756-832 (2d ed.
1973).
137. 646 F.2d at 107.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 128-130.
139. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229, 239 (1969).
140. E.g., Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981); Monell v. Dept. of
Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
141. See Brown v. Morgan County, 518 F. Supp. 661, 664 (N.D. Ala. 1981).
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Finally, under the Miller analysis, a plaintiff must show that re
medial statutes are not traditionally more a federal concern than a
state concern. This may be demonstrated by the fact that section
1983 is a federal statute, silent as to remedies, and section 1988,
which refers to section 1983, directs courts to use state law. 142 More
over, it has been stated that remedies are more suited to "statutory
rather than judicial solution"143 and a plaintiff may argue that the
applicable codified state law should be applied rather than the fed
eral common law. l44
Under the Miller analysis, therefore, a plaintiff is able to better
demonstrate that a state law permitting punitive damage awards
against municipal defendants is not fundamentally inconsistent with
section 1983 and the other civil rights statutes. The extensive inter
pretations already given by the Court regarding municipal liabil
ity'45 and punitive damages,'46 however, make the chances appear
slight that federal courts will accept state laws that impinge on these
interpretations. Such laws are likely to be considered inconsistent
with section 1983 whether viewed under the traditional Robertson or
the enhanced Miller test.
3.

Uniformity

Uniformity of the federal remedial scheme is another obstacle
that must be overcome when petitioning for use of state law by the
provisions of section 1988. Many cases point out that Congress
could not have intended for remedies to vary from state to state be
cause the purposes of the statute would not be fully effective. 147
Some courts seem to interpret section 1988 as directing the use of
federal common law, but then label the state law or the rule that
142. See supra notes 115-117 and accompanying text; if. Middlesex County Sewer
age Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Assoc., 453 U.S. I (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting in
part) (no express remedy or comprehensive remedial scheme plus intent of section 1988
shows a clear congressional mandate to preserve all existing remedies).
143. 646 F.2d at 107.
144. Statutes of limitations and other state statutory matters have been applied.
E.g., Johnson v. Rogers, 621 F.2d 300 (8th Cir. 1980) (applying Minnesota law ofcontri
bution); Brown v. Morgan County, 518 F. Supp. 661 (N.D. Ala. 1981) (Georgia survival
statute used).
145. E.g., Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980); Monell v. New
York Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
146. Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
147. E.g., Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 86 (3d Cir. 1965); Brazier v. Cherry, 293
F.2d 401, 408 (5th Cir. 1961); Wilcher v. Gain, 311 F. Supp. 754, 755 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
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court wishes to apply the federal common law. 148 On the other
hand, section 1988 has also been said to mean that "both federal and
state rules or damages may be utilized, whichever better serves the
policies expressed in the federal statutes."149 This suggests that vari
ance between states may have been intended by enacting section
1988. The majority of courts, however, emphasize a uniform reme
dial scheme or a federal common law of remedies for civil rights
violations, rather than allowing different state laws to be applied. 150
Therefore, a plaintiff seeking to apply state law authorizing punitive
damages against municipalities may not be successful because the
application of such a law would not result in a uniform remedial
scheme.
As the foregoing analysis indicates, it is unlikely that the appli
cation of section 1988 will realistically aid a plaintiff who is pursuing
punitive damages from a municipality for violation of civil rights,
even when state law provides for such damages. To successfully use
section 1988, the requirements of its three-part test must be fulfilled.
Failure to obtain punitive damages from the defending government
may not be deemed a deficiency. Though section 1983 is silent as to
available remedies, compensatory damages remain available. 151 Ad
ditionally, Fact Concerts has filled the silence of section 1983 on the
issue of punitive damage and has prohibited them against municipal
defendants. Awards of punitive damages may be considered incon
sistent with the federal statutory plan as implied by the Fact Con
certs rule prohibiting damages of this type. 152 Moreover, awards of
148. See Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229, 256 (1969) (dissenting opin
ion); Note, supra note 120, at 1221; Eisenberg, supra note 118, at 518-521.
149. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229, 240 (1969).
150. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 147.
151. See infra notes 120-127 and accompanying text.
152. See infra notes 132-134 and accompanying text. This unsuccessful result
seems likely even though section 1988 has been described as "responsive . . . whenever a
federal right is impaired," Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229, 240 (1969), and
"sweeping ... [,) reftect[ing) ... that the redress available will effectuate the broad
policies of the civil rights statutes," Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401, 408 (5th Cir. 1961);
if. Eisenberg, supra note 118, at 499-500 (The lack of success of such an attempt is due to
a misunderstanding of § 1988's true purpose and inconsistent interpretations of § 1988 by
the Supreme Court.).
The failure of the section 1988 strategy may also be predicted due to the lack of
success of cases seeking to use section 1988 to permit liability of a municipality prior to
Monell, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). E.g., Wilcher v. Gain, 311 F. Supp. 754 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
Bul see Kates & Kouba, supra note 130, at 160-61 and supra note 132, (contending that
Wilcher was decided wrongly); Johnson v. Rogers, 621 F.2d 300 (8th Cir. 1980) (allowing
contribution under state law by § 1988); Brown v. Morgan County, 518 F. Supp. 661
(N.D. Ala. 1981) (allowing state survival statute under § 1988). See generally Brennan,
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punitive damages based on state law would cause lack of uniform
remedies for violation of civil rights governed by section 1983. 153 Al
though section 1988 suggests that state law may be used, a plaintiff
seeking su~h damages is likely to fare better in state court l54 or by
bringing the state claims in federal court with the federal section
1983 claim.155
C.

Pendent Jurisdiction
It may not be necessary for a plaintiff in a section 1983 claim to

separate claims between state and federal courts or to bring suit only
in state court to obtain punitive damages against a municipal de
fendant. The Fact Concerts Court did not address the issue of pen
dent jurisdiction but left it open. 156 Therefore, if a plaintiff chooses
to bring the civil rights action in a federal court, the prohibition
against punitive damage awards from municipalities may be over
come by joining the state claim that allows punitive damages against
a municipality with the federal section 1983 claim under the doctrine
of pendent jurisdiction.
The doctrine of pendent jurisdiction is a judicial creation, al
lowing federal courts to assert jurisdiction over certain claims or par
ties which are outside the congressional mandate of power given
federal courts. 157 The tests to be applied to determine if pendent ju
risdiction may be invoked have evolved slowly and this evolution
has created an intricate and complex structure which is often mis
construed. It is therefore necessary to examine the basic structure of
pendent jurisdiction before discussing its application to section 1983
litigation. 158
State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977)
(encouraging use of state constitutions and law where more protective of civil rights).
153. State legislatures which have determined on their own that punitive damages
may be assessed against municipalities in their state will not be given credence in a fed
eral court, although it appears that no financial burden is placed on unprepared or dis
abled municipalities if the state has so provided. Note, supra note 120, at 1221-22.
154. Federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over section 1983 ac
tions. See Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1,36 n.17 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
155. See infra notes 157-199 and accompanying text.
156. 453 U.S. at 254 n.6.
157. See generally 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 3567 at 439-62 (1975 and Cum. Supp. 1980). U.S. CONST. art. Ill,
§ 2, cl. 2, empowers Congress to ascertain jurisdiction of the federal courts. A claim or
party is outside the jurisdiction of a federal court if there is a lack of diversity or insuffi
cient amount in controversy. See 28 U.S.c. § 1332 (1976).
158. This discussion utilizes the structure of pendent jurisdiction as set out, simply
and notably, in A Closer Look at Pendent and Ancl1/ary Jurisdiction: Toward a Theory of
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The Structure of Pendent Jurisdiction

The early rule, defining the scope of pendent jurisdiction, was
enunciated prior to the institution of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro
cedure and stated that state and federal claims could be brought to
gether in federal court if they stemmed from the same cause of
action. 159 Because this test was eventually found to be repugnant to
the policy of liberal joinder of claims and parties as propounded by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 160 and was difficult to apply, it
was replaced by a two-part test created in United Mine Workers v.
Gibbs. 161
The first aspect of the Gibbs test is based on the constitutional
power given to federal courtS. 162 A state claim may be appended to
a federal claim if the federal claim is substantial and both claims
arise from a "common nucleus of operative fact" and should be tried
in one proceeding such that they are considered to comprise one con
stitutional case. 163 The Gibbs Court, however, sharply curtailed the
ability to add claims through this constitutional power by holding
that federal courts always have discretion to dismiss any state claims
a plaintiff seeks to add. l64 If judicial economy, convenience or fair
ness are not served, or if jury confusion is prevented, the state claim
may be dismissed, even though the court has "power" over the
case. 165
The other factors considered in determining whether to assert
pendent jurisdiction deal generally with examination of the relevant
jurisdictional statute. 166 The factors in this examination include con
gressional intent, the posture of the parties, and the difference beIncidental Jurisdiction, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1935 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Incidental Ju
risdiction ].
The author of that article uses the term "incidental jurisdiction" to cover both pen
dent and ancillary jurisdiction. Since what has come to be known as ancillary jurisdic
tion is unlikely to be sought in the context discussed here, only pendent jurisdiction is
mentioned.
159. Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 245-46 (1933).
160. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966); see also FED. R.
CIv. P. 14, 18, 20.
161. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
162. Id. at 725.
163. Id. The term "one Case" refers to article III of the United States Constitution.
164. fd. at 726.
165. Id. The courts are also directed to examine whether the case involves a sub
stantial federal question or whether the state claims predominate.
166. See Incidental Jurisdiction, supra note 158, at 1939-46. See also Aldinger v.
Howard, 427 U.S. I (1976); Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365
(1978).
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tween joining a claim or a party. 167
In Aldinger v. Howard,168 a plaintiff, in a pre-Monell 169 section
1983 action, sought to impose liability upon a county.l7O Counties
and other local governments were not, by the then-current interpre
tation, intended to be held liable under section 1983 nor under the
statute govemingjurisdiction over civil rights cases.l7l TheAldinger
Court stated that permitting the state claim to be used would violate
congressional intent behind the jurisdictional statute. 172 Generally,
the state claim may not be added if it causes the jurisdiction of the
relevant statute to be asserted over claims or parties not intended to
be covered by that statute. 173
The Court, however, in Owen Equipment and Erection Co. v.
Kroger 174 stated that, in addition to examining the congressional in
tent of a jurisdictional statute, the posture of the parties must be
taken into account. 175 The Kroger Court would not defeat the con
gressional intent of the statute conferring diversity jurisdiction,
which had been interpreted as requiring complete diversity,176 when
the party who chose the federal forum sought to assert pendent juris
diction over a claim. 177 The Court suggested, however, that a party
in federal court involuntarily might be permitted to add a state
claim, even if it seemed contrary to the language of the jurisdictional
statute. 178 The question of which party chose the federal forum and
whether that party was in an offensive or defensive position is there
fore important to the pendent jurisdiction analysis.
The issue of whether a party or a claim is sought to be joined
Incidental Jurisdiction, supra note 158, at 1941.
427 U.S. I (1976).
436 U.S. 658 (1978). See supra text accompanying notes 68-76.
427 U.S. at 4-5.
28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (Supp. V 1981).
427 U.S. at 18-19.
This pertains to all jurisdictional statutes; e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (federal
question), 1332 (diversity) & 1343 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). See Owen Equipment & Erec
tion Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978) ("The limits upon federal jurisdiction,
whether imposed by the Constitution or by Congress, must be neither disregarded nor
evaded.").
174. 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
175. Id at 373; see generally Incidental Jurisdiction, supra note 158, at 1940, 1943
45.
176. 437 U.S. at 372 (citing Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806)).
177. Id at 374 (the plaintiff may not complain and must accept the limitations of
the federal court if plaintiff chose to bring suit there).
178. Id at 375-76. For example, a defendant or impleaded party or a plaintiff in
an action removed from state court would all be in federal court involuntarily.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
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through pendent jurisdiction was also considered in Aldinger .179 The
Aldinger Court implied that adding a party may violate the power
given the federal courts more than adding a claim. ISO It was sug
gested that it would be unfair, as well as being beyond the courts'
statutory authority, to assert jurisdiction over a party over whom no
independent basis of jurisdiction existed. lSI The Court noted that it
was not as unseemly to allow parties already facing each other in a
federal dispute to litigate one more claim.ls2

2.

Application of the Pendent Jurisdiction Doctrine to
Section 1983 Litigation

The matter of whether a state claim or party is sought to be
added, the posture of the parties, and the congressional intent of the
jurisdictional statute must be considered by a federal court in the
decision of whether to assert jurisdiction, as well as whether the
court has power over the claim or party. The final decision of assert
ing pendent jurisdiction over a state claim remains, of course, within
the discretion of the federal court. Therefore, a plaintiff in a section
1983 action who seeks pendent jurisdiction of a state claim which
allows punitive damages against a municipality must take all of
these factors into account.
The constitutional prerequisites enunciated in the Gibbs power
test are likely to be fulfilled since the section 1983 claim will be con
sidered a substantial federal question, provided that the claim is not
fabricated, and the facts of the state claim are likely to stem from the
same operative facts causing violation of the plaintiffs rights. ls3 The
claims should, therefore, be tried in one lawsuit and are one case.
While a court always has the discretion to dismiss a pendent state
claim, it also seems that the interests of convenience, judicial econ
omy and fairness are served if the state claim is allowed to be de
179. 427 U.S. at 14-15.
180. Id at IS, 18. See Incidental Jurisdiction, supra note 158, at 1946. The article
states that more practical difficulties and procedural burdens arise when a party is added
than when a claim is added. Adding a claim involves just another dispute between the
parties already involved; judicial economy and convenience, tools of discretion, are not
compromised as they are by the addition of a party. Id It is for this reason that it may
be argued, alternatively, that this factor of adding a claim or party is really a part of the
Gibbs discretion test.
181. Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 14.
182. Id
183. But see, e.g., Kedra v. City of Philadelphia, 454 F. Supp. 652, 682 (D.C. Pa.
1978) (court decided pendent state claims against city although section 1983 claim
improper).
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cided with the federal section 1983 claim. 184
Examination of the congressional intent behind the jurisdic
tional statute governing civil rights,185 however, may indicate that
Congress did not intend this type of state claim to be appended. Be
cause Fact Concerts determined that the 42d Congress did not intend
for punitive damages to be assessed against a municipality in civil
rights actions,186 a court may determine that the congressional intent
behind the jurisdictional statute governing civil rights actions was to
disallow claims seeking this type of damages to be added by pendent
jurisdiction. 187
The statute governing general federal question jurisdiction, 188
however, is also applicable to section 1983 cases. The congressional
intent behind this statute, especially since the amount in controversy
has been eliminated,189 is to encourage federal question cases to be
heard in federal courtS.190 Rather than forcing the plaintiff to bring
the section 1983 action, a federal question, to the state court for the
state claim to be adjudicated, federal courts may allow the claim to
be added to determine the federal question fully, as Congress seems
to have intended. 191
184. Juries would not be confused by the addition of a punitive damages claim and
the federal question (§ 1983) would still predominate. Any existing confusion on the part
of the jury may be detected through use of special verdicts. See FED. R. CIV. P. 49.
185. 28 U.S.c. § 1343 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
186. 453 U.S. at 271.
187. C;: Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 16-17. An analogous situation was involved in
Teamsters Union v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252 (1964). In Morton, the Court determined that
the congressional intent of the federal statute governing secondary boycotts, section 303
of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, 29 U.S.c. § 187 (1976), which provides for actions to
recover "damages ... sustained," id , was to displace state law which might provide for
other than actual, compensatory damages. Morton, 377 U.S. at 260-61. The Court's
interpretation of the congressional intent of this statute effectively forbade the exercise of
pendent jurisdiction over state claims seeking punitive damages based on state law. Id
at 257.
188. 28 U.S.c. § 1331 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
189. 28 U.S.c. § 1331(a)(1976) was amended December I, 1980 by Pub. L. No. 96
486, § 2(a), 94 Stat. 2369 (1980), which struck out the amount in controversy requirement
for federal question cases. The amended jurisdictional statute is codified at 28 U.S.c.
§ 1331 (Supp. V 1981).
190. North Dakota v. Merchants Bank & Trust Co., 634 F.2d 368, 373-74 (1980)
(elimination of the amount in controversy for federal question cases demonstrates that
Congress considered these suits important and pendent parties and claims intertwined
with these cases should not be excluded); Irwin v. Calhoun, 522 F. Supp. 576 (D. Mass.
1981) (pendent jurisdiction exercised in section 1983 cases grounded on expansive scope
of section 1331 as amended); Kedra v. City of Philadelphia, 454 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. Pa.
1978) (court has power to hear pendent claims in section 1983 case based on section 1331
but court, in its discretion, declined to exercise this power).
191. See, e.g., Irwin v. Calhoun, 522 F. Supp. 576 (D. Mass. 1981).
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The fact that the addition of a claim is being sought, and not the
addition of a party, demonstrates that there is no great burden being
placed on the defendant or on the courts.192 Because few impedi
ments are being added, the state claim should be permitted to be
litigated with the federal one. 193 The offensive party, the plaintiff, is
attempting to append the claim, however. If the plaintiff initially
brought the suit in federal court, the court may require the claim to
be brought separately in state court since that forum is available and
federal jurisdiction is not exclusive. 194 This result, though, might un
dermine the congressional intent of vindicating federal claims in fed
eral court 195 and the state claim should be permitted in federal
court. 196 If the case were removed, plaintiff is not in federal court
voluntarily, and the state claim should be heard. 197
The above analysis suggests that plaintiffs may utilize the doc
trine of pendent jurisdiction when seeking to recover punitive dam
ages against a municipality under applicable state law in a section
1983 claim. Other section 1983 cases seeking to assert pendent juris
diction over other types of claims have been successful. 198 A section
1983 case seeking to add a state claim permitting punitive damages
against a municipal defendant should attain the same result. 199
192. Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 14, 18; if. Kroger, 437 U.S. at 376.
193. North Dakota v. Merchants Bank & Trust Co., 634 F.2d 368, 371-74 (1980)
(pendent jurisdiction asserted over state claim against new party).
194. See supra note IS4. The Supreme Court has observed that concern for judi
cial economy is not as great where "the efficiency plaintiff seeks so avidly is available
without question in the state courts." Aldinger, 427 U.S. at IS (quoting Kenrose Mfg. Co.
v. Fred Whittaker Co., SI2 F.2d 890, 894 (4th Cir. 1972)); see also Kroger, 437 U.S. at
376.
19S. Incidental Jurisdiction, supra note IS8, at 19S0.
196. Courts' discretionary power may also be pursued. Courts may recognize that
even though the plaintiff is in an offensive posture, it is only fair to try all the claims
together.
197. Again, the discretionary power of the court may playa part. The court may
find it unfair to force a plaintiff who originally brought suit in state court to bear the
burden, financial and otherwise, of bringing this claim in state court while litigating the
original claim in the federal court.
198. E.g., Brown v. Morgan County, SI8 F. Supp. 661 (N.D. Ala. 1981) (survivor
ship claims); if. Miley v. Oppenheimer and Co., Inc., 637 F.2d 318 (Sth Cir. 1981) (puni
tive damages permitted through pendent state claim in a case brought under Rule IOb-S
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Young v. Taylor, 466 F.2d 1329 (10th Cir. 1972)
(pendent jurisdiction over state claim allowing punitive damages in a case brought under
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Rule IOb-S).
199. Pre-Monell cases attempting to hold municipalities liable through state laws
were unsuccessful. E.g., Wilcher v. Gain, 311 F. Supp. 7S4 (N.D. Cal. 1970). Arguably,
these cases were decided wrongly and should not be dispositive. See Kates & Kouba,
supra note 130, at 160-61.
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CONCLUSION

In Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc. ,200 the United States Supreme
Court held that punitive damages may not be assessed against mu
nicipalities in suits brought under section 1983 of the Civil Rights
Act of 187l,20I The Fact Concerts Court studied its prior decision of
Monell v. New York Department of Social Services,202 which reversed
Monroe v. Pape ,203 and held that cities may be liable for violations
of civil rights under section 1983. As in those cases, the Fact Con
certs Court was concerned with carrying out the policies of section
1983. These policies were to compensate for and deter further viola
tions of civil rights. The Fact Concerts Court also examined the pol
icies behind punitive damages and found that neither the retributive
or deterrent purposes of punitive damages nor the purposes behind
section 1983 were served by such awards against municipal
governments.
Fact Concerts, however, does not mean that a plaintiff is fore
closed from obtaining punitive damages from a municipal defend
ant. Some state laws allow such damages to be awarded. Contrary
to Fact Concerts' blanket prohibition against it, two strategies are
available when seeking to attain this type of remedy in those states
which allow it: section 1988 and pendent jurisdiction.
The use of section 1988 is the strategy with less potential for
success in urging that punitive damages be awarded against munici
palities. The requirements of the three-part test for applying state
remedies through section 1988 cannot be easily met. The court may
not view the denial of punitive damages as a deficiency in the federal
remedial scheme embodied in section 1988 and may find that per
mitting such damages destroys any uniformity that this scheme may
possess. Additionally, although section 1983 is silent as to damages,
the rule laid down in Fact Concerts may be seen as an accurate inter
pretation of the federal rule intended by Congress. Thus the appli
cation of a state law that permits punitive damages against a
municipality may be viewed as being inconsistent with the federal
rule. Punitive damages against a municipality, therefore, do not
seem to be forthcoming through use of section 1988.
Use of the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, however, may be
successful as the state claim may be appended to the federal section
200.
201.
202.
203.

453 U.S. 247 (1981).
42 U.S.c. § 1983 (Supp. V 1981).
436 U.S. 658 (1978).
365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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1983 claim. Federal courts have power over a state claim when it
arises from a common nucleus of operative fact with a substantial
federal claim such that the two claims, when brought together, com
prise one constitutional case unless the relevant jurisdictional stat
utes preclude the appending of such a state claim. Once the power
of the federal court has been ascertained, however, the court still
retains discretion over whether to assert pendent jurisdiction. Using
this discretionary power, federal courts may determine that the state
and federal claims should be heard together in a federal court. A
plaintiff, therefore, might be able to collect punitive damages from a
municipal defendant in this manner. Although the holding of Fact
Concerts would seem to forbid such a result, the use of pendent ju
risdiction to obtain punitive damages from municipal defendants in
section 1983 actions diminishes the impact of Fact Concerts. Al
though the Court did not address the use of this judicially-created
doctrine, the rights of victims of civil rights violations for whom pu
nitive damages seem warranted or essential may be fully vindicated
through its use.
Marcia E. Prussel

